A new irrelevance result in an endogenous timing with a consumer-friendly public firm by Garcia, Arturo et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A new irrelevance result in an
endogenous timing with a
consumer-friendly public firm
Arturo Garcia and Mariel Leal and Sang-Ho Lee
Technologico de Moterrey, Mexico, Technologico de Moterrey,
Mexico, Chonnam National University, Korea
1 April 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/85648/
MPRA Paper No. 85648, posted 2 April 2018 07:47 UTC
A new irrelevance result in an endogenous timing with a consumer-
friendly public firm 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study considers a mixed duopoly with a consumer-friendly public firm and analyzes an endogenous 
timing game in the presence of output subsidy and emission tax. We provide a new irrelevance result 
concerning the choice of government policy in which regardless of the policy mix, the equilibrium of 
endogenous market structure is determined by the public firm’s concern on consumer surplus. We also show 
that the optimal policy mix can attain the first-best allocation for social welfare only when both firms have 
symmetric payoffs, which results in simultaneous-move outcome. 
Keywords:  irrelevance result; endogenous timing game; consumer-friendly public firm; emission tax; 
output subsidy 
 
I.  Introduction 
Earlier studies for mixed markets where a public firm coexists with private ones have established 
a series of so-called “irrelevance results”, which states that the first-best allocation for welfare can 
be attained if output is subsidized. It implies that privatization does not alter welfare, regardless of 
time structure, competition mode and the degree of privatization. Thus, it is also called “privatization 
neutrality theorem”. 1 In their formulation, the objective function of the public firm is welfare-
maximization, which considers not only consumer surplus but also industry profits. Thus, there exists 
the payoff interdependence between the public and private firms.2 
Rather than focusing on the welfare effect of a public firm, this paper considers a variant of mixed 
duopoly with a consumer-friendly public firm, which cares for its own profits and some portion of 
consumer surplus, as a proxy of its concern on the society. This approach is a subset of corporate 
                                                     
1 Since White (1996) and Pal and White (1998) reported, subsequent works supported these results. See Poyago-Theotoky 
(2001), Tomaru (2006), Kato and Tomaru (2007), Hashimzade et al. (2007), Zikos (2007), Tomaru and Saito (2010) and 
Matsumura and Okumura (2013) among others. However, Fjell and Heywood (2004), Cato and Matsumura (2013), 
Matsumura and Tomaru (2013, 2015) and Lee and Tomaru (2017) showed that it might fail under certain environments 
with foreign competitors, free entry, excess burden of taxation and R&D spillovers. 
2 As the payoff interdependent approach, Matsumura et al. (2013) and Matsumura and Okamura (2015) also formulated 
a mixed oligopoly market where the private firms consider their rival’s profits as well. 
social responsibility (CSR), which is increasingly popular not only in the real world but in academic 
research in both empirical and theoretical economics.3 As a public firm may or may not share the 
same objectives as the government, we can also interpret this objective function as a situation that 
public firm takes its profit-maximizing decision under consumer surplus-constrained regulation in 
which consumer surplus in the market does not fall below a fixed level.4 
In this study, we investigate an endogenous timing game in a mixed duopoly in which firms choose 
quantities simultaneously or sequentially. We also introduce a negative externality and abatement 
activities into the model where the production in both public and private firms leads to pollution. In 
the presence of emission tax and output subsidy, we show that a simultaneous movement is the only 
equilibrium when the concern on consumer surplus is small while a sequential movement can be an 
equilibrium when the concern on consumer surplus is large. 
These results coincide with the previous findings which consider neither externality nor 
government intervention. Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) showed that firms decide simultaneously 
when both firms have symmetric payoffs while Pal (1998) showed that firms decide sequentially 
when a private firm competes with a public firm which maximizes not only consumer surplus but also 
industry profits. Similarly, as the consumer-friendly public firm more concerns consumer surplus in 
our formulation, it produces more aggressively than the simultaneous case and thus more industry 
outputs yields higher consumer surplus. 
However, the literature in the standard mixed duopoly model with a welfare-maximizing public 
firm also showed that the outcomes of the endogenous timing game with externality depend critically 
on the significance of externality. In particular, Matsumura and Ogawa (2017) showed that a 
simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome is an equilibrium under a significant (insignificant) 
externality without emission tax. However, incorporating the optimal emission tax in each market 
structure, Lee and Xu (2017) showed that the results are reversed. They provided an important policy 
implications that the degree of internalization of externality may change the competition structure 
                                                     
3 See CSR trend report by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2010) and KPMG (2015). Lyon and Maxwell (2004), Kitzmueller and 
Shimshack (2012) and Crifo and Forget (2015) provided fruitful discussions on the practical and academic issues on CSR. 
4 Note that the result of price regulation is equivalent to that of the rate-of-return regulation for public firm, in which the 
government obtains the market quantities and prices that maximize consumer surplus subject to permitting the firm to 
earn some fixed profit. For more detailed discussions on this point, see Brennan (1989), Lee (1998) and Xu et al. (2016). 
and indirectly affect the resulting emission and welfare levels. 
We re-examine the mixed duopoly with externality and government intervention through output 
subsidy and emission tax. In the presence of a consumer-friendly public firm, we investigate different 
timing of game structure that government chooses the policy mix of output subsidy and emission tax 
in the beginning of endogenous timing game. Interestingly, our analysis reveals that regardless of the 
policy mix, the equilibrium of endogenous market structure is determined solely by the consumer-
friendly firm’s concern on consumer surplus. Thus, the equilibrium mode of competition remains 
unaffected by government tax/subsidy policy. Thus, we provide a new irrelevance result in terms of 
the choice of government policy. This is surprisingly different to the standard mixed duopoly model 
where the government policy significantly affects endogenous timing outcomes that firms choose for 
production. Hence, our findings on the first-mover position of the government are in sharp contrast 
to the case that government takes second-mover position in mixed duopolies with a welfare-
maximizing public firm.5 
Our results also contain important implications on the objective functions of the public firm. If it 
is a welfare-maximizing firm, privatization does not alter welfare regardless of time structure, but an 
appropriately scheduled policy mix is important to obtain the best outcomes to the society. However, 
if it does not care for the industry profits, government subsidy/tax policies before the firms’ 
endogenous choices of market roles will not change competition mode and market structure. This is 
a new finding that is neglected in the literature. 
Finally, we show that the optimal policy mix can attain the first-best allocation for social welfare 
only when the concern on consumer surplus is abandoned and thus both firms have symmetric 
payoffs, which results in a simultaneous-move outcome. 6  Otherwise, two sequential-move 
outcomes might appear as equilibrium results.7 We believe that our findings potentially provide new 
                                                     
5 In Appendix, we also show that our findings do not hold under the standard mixed duopoly model where welfare-
maximizing public firm exists. Tomaru and Saito (2010) examined the same timing of game structure with our formulation 
in a standard mixed duopoly model under output subsidization policy. They showed that simultaneous competition is an 
equilibrium outcome with a higher output subsidy rate only. Thus, the equilibrium also depends on the government 
subsidy policy. 
6 Under asymmetric information in a private oligopoly, Kim and Chang (1993), Kim and Lee (1995), and Lee (1997) 
proposed that optimal subsidy/tax policy can attain the first-best outcomes to the society. 
7 For example, Tomaru and Saito (2010) showed that simultaneous competition is an equilibrium outcome with a higher 
output subsidy while Lee and Xu (2017) showed that private leadership outcome can be an equilibrium outcome with an 
emission tax. 
insights into the behavior of firms and contribute to the literature in endogenizing the strategic choice 
of government policy in mixed market settings. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, we formulate a mixed duopoly 
model with a consumer-friendly public firm. We analyze the simultaneous and sequential movements 
in section III, and compare the outcomes to find an endogenous timing equilibrium in section IV. In 
section V, we construct optimal policy mix and examine the first-best outcomes. Final section concludes 
the paper. 
 
II.  Model 
We consider a mixed duopoly in a quantity-setting game. One of the firms is a consumer-friendly 
(CF) firm (hereafter referred to as firm 0) that cares for not only its profits but consumers surplus. 
The other is a for-profit (FP) firm (hereafter referred to as firm 1) that maximizes only its profits. 
Firms sell their outputs, 𝑞𝑞0 ≥ 0 and 𝑞𝑞1 ≥ 0, respectively, at the market clearing price 𝑝𝑝(𝑄𝑄) = 1 −
𝑄𝑄 where 𝑄𝑄 = 𝑞𝑞0 + 𝑞𝑞1. We assume that both firms have identical technologies and the production 
cost function takes a quadratic form, 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖) = 12 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖2, 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {0,1}. 
The production in both CF and FP firms leads to pollution 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, but each firm can prevent pollution 
by undertaking abatement activities. Suppose an end-of-pipe technology that the emission level of 
each firm is given by 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  when firm 𝑖𝑖 chooses pollution abatement level 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, where firm 
𝑖𝑖  can reduce its emission by investing an amount of 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖
2
2
 in abatement activities. The extent of 
environmental damage due to pollution by the industry is assumed to be given by 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = (∑𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖)2
2
. The 
government imposes both an environmental tax on the emission level for which the tax rate is 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0 
and an output subsidy for which the subsidy rate is 𝑠𝑠 ≥ 0. The resulting total tax revenue is 𝑇𝑇 =
𝑡𝑡 ∑𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 and the total subsidy expenditure is 𝑆𝑆 = 𝑠𝑠𝑄𝑄 
The profit of CF firm is given by 𝜋𝜋0 = (𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠) ⋅ 𝑞𝑞0 − 12 𝑞𝑞02 − 𝑡𝑡 ⋅ 𝑒𝑒0 − 𝑎𝑎022 . We assume that the CF 
firm maximizes profits plus a fraction of the consumer surplus (𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆). Thus, the payoff that CF firm 
maximizes is as follows:  
 𝑉𝑉0 = 𝜋𝜋0 + 𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 (1) 
 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 = 𝑄𝑄2
2
. The parameter 𝜃𝜃 ∈ [0,1] measures the degree of concern on consumer surplus 
that the CF firm has, which is exogenously given. 
The FP firm seeks only for profit maximization:  
 𝜋𝜋1 = (𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠) ⋅ 𝑞𝑞1 − 12 𝑞𝑞12 − 𝑡𝑡 ⋅ 𝑒𝑒1 − 𝑎𝑎122  (2) 
 
Then, the social welfare is the sum of consumer surplus CS, both firms’ profits 𝜋𝜋0 + 𝜋𝜋1, and tax 
revenue 𝑇𝑇, minus environmental damage 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 and subsidy expenditure 𝑆𝑆:  
 𝑊𝑊 = 𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 + 𝜋𝜋0 + 𝜋𝜋1 + 𝑇𝑇 − 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 − 𝑆𝑆 (3) 
 
The game runs as follows: In the first stage, the government chooses the levels of emission tax 
and output subsidy to maximize social welfare. In the second stage, both firms commit market 
structure simultaneously. In the last stage, each firm decides output and abatement levels 
simultaneously according to its commitment move structure. The backward induction produces a 
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. 
 
III.  Fixed timing game 
In this section, we consider fixed move structures: Simultaneous-move competition and 
Stackelberg competition with CF and FP leadership. We assume that the fixed move structures have 
interior solutions; 0 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 < 1 + 𝑠𝑠. 
 
a.  Simultaneous-move game 
In this game, the firms independently chooses its abatement effort level (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) and output (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖), 𝑖𝑖 ∈{0,1}. Solving the first-order conditions for maximizing the payoffs of both firms in (1) and (2), 
respectively, we obtain the following equilibrium quantities and abatement level:  
 𝑞𝑞0𝑐𝑐 = (1+𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡)(2+𝜃𝜃)2(4−𝜃𝜃) ,    𝑞𝑞1𝑐𝑐 = (1+𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡)(2−𝜃𝜃)2(4−𝜃𝜃) ,    𝑎𝑎0𝑐𝑐 = 𝑎𝑎1𝑐𝑐 = 𝑡𝑡 (4) 
 
where superscript ‘𝑐𝑐’ denotes the Cournot game. It may be useful to note the ceteris paribus effects 
of 𝑡𝑡 , 𝑠𝑠  and 𝜃𝜃 . We note that ∂𝑞𝑞0𝑐𝑐 ∂𝑡𝑡⁄ < ∂𝑞𝑞1𝑐𝑐 ∂𝑡𝑡⁄ < 0 , ∂𝑞𝑞0𝑐𝑐 ∂𝑠𝑠⁄ > ∂𝑞𝑞1𝑐𝑐 ∂𝑠𝑠⁄ > 0 , and ∂𝑞𝑞1𝑐𝑐 ∂𝜃𝜃⁄ < 0 <
∂𝑞𝑞0
𝑐𝑐 ∂𝜃𝜃⁄ , ∂(𝑞𝑞0𝑐𝑐 + 𝑞𝑞1𝑐𝑐) ∂𝜃𝜃⁄ > 0 . Thus, the CF firm is more sensitive to the tax and subsidy in a 
simultaneous-move game. Thus, if the concern on consumer surplus rises, its direct effect (ignoring 
any effect on the tax and subsidy) is predictably positive on the CF firm’s output, negative on firm 1’s 
output, but positive on the aggregate output. 
The equilibrium payoffs and social welfare are, respectively: 
 
 𝑉𝑉0𝑐𝑐 = 𝑡𝑡2�76−20𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃2�+�12(1+𝜃𝜃)−5𝜃𝜃2�(1+𝑠𝑠)(1+𝑠𝑠−2𝑡𝑡)8(4−𝜃𝜃)2 , 
 𝜋𝜋1𝑐𝑐 = 𝑡𝑡2�76−44𝜃𝜃+7𝜃𝜃2�+3(2−𝜃𝜃)2(1+𝑠𝑠)(1+𝑠𝑠−2𝑡𝑡)8(4−𝜃𝜃)2 , 
 Wc = −�5+2s+s2−2t−2st+13t2�(4−θ)2+8(2+s+t)(1+s−t)(4−θ)−36(1+s−t)2
4(4−θ)2  (5) 
 
b.  CF firm as a Stackelberg leader 
In this case, firm 0 first chooses its output and abatement levels and then firm 1 makes its 
choice sequentially. Then, we have the following equilibrium quantities and abatement level: 
 
 𝑞𝑞0
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 2(1+𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡)(3+𝜃𝜃)
21−4𝜃𝜃
,    𝑞𝑞1𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = (1+𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡)(5−2𝜃𝜃)21−4𝜃𝜃 ,    𝑎𝑎0𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝑎𝑎1𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝑡𝑡 (6) 
 
where superscript ‘𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ’ denotes the equilibrium outcome in the Stackelberg game with CF firm 
leadership. It may be useful to note that ∂𝑞𝑞0
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∂𝑡𝑡⁄ < ∂𝑞𝑞1𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∂𝑡𝑡⁄ < 0 , ∂𝑞𝑞0𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∂𝑠𝑠⁄ > ∂𝑞𝑞1𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∂𝑠𝑠⁄ > 0 , and 
∂𝑞𝑞1
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∂𝜃𝜃⁄ < 0 < ∂𝑞𝑞0𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ∂𝜃𝜃⁄ , ∂(𝑞𝑞0𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝑞𝑞1𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐) ∂𝜃𝜃⁄ > 0 . These results are the same with those in a 
simultaneous-move game. 
The equilibrium payoffs and social welfare are, respectively: 
 
 𝑉𝑉0
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝑡𝑡2(25+𝜃𝜃)+(4+5𝜃𝜃)(1+𝑠𝑠)(1+𝑠𝑠−2𝑡𝑡)
2(21−4𝜃𝜃) , 
 𝜋𝜋1
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 4𝑡𝑡2�129−57𝜃𝜃+7𝜃𝜃2�+3(5−2𝜃𝜃)2(1+𝑠𝑠)(1+𝑠𝑠−2𝑡𝑡)
2(21−4𝜃𝜃)2 , 
 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = −�1+2𝑠𝑠+𝑠𝑠2−2𝑡𝑡−2𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+13𝑡𝑡2�(21−4𝜃𝜃)2+44(2+𝑠𝑠+𝑡𝑡)(1+𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡)(21−4𝜃𝜃)−1089(1+𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡)2
4(21−4𝜃𝜃)2  (7) 
 
c.  FP firm as a Stackelberg leader 
In this case, firm 1 first chooses its output and abatement levels and then firm 0 makes its 
choice sequentially. Then, we have the following equilibrium quantities and abatement level:  
 𝑞𝑞0
𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 = (1+𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡)(5+(2−𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃)(7−𝜃𝜃)(3−𝜃𝜃) ,    𝑞𝑞1𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 = (1+𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡)(2−𝜃𝜃)7−𝜃𝜃 ,    𝑎𝑎0𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 = 𝑎𝑎1𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 = 𝑡𝑡 (8) 
 
where superscript ‘𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 ’ denotes the equilibrium outcome in the Stackelberg game with FP firm 
leadership. We note that if 0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 < 7−√41
4
 then ∂𝑞𝑞1
𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 ∂𝑡𝑡⁄ < ∂𝑞𝑞0𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 ∂𝑡𝑡⁄ < 0, and ∂𝑞𝑞1𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 ∂𝑠𝑠⁄ > ∂𝑞𝑞0𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 ∂𝑠𝑠⁄ > 0; 
if 7−√41
4
< 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1 , we have ∂𝑞𝑞0𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 ∂𝑡𝑡⁄ < ∂𝑞𝑞1𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 ∂𝑡𝑡⁄ < 0 , and ∂𝑞𝑞0𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 ∂𝑠𝑠⁄ > ∂𝑞𝑞1𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 ∂𝑠𝑠⁄ > 0 . In both cases, 
∂𝑞𝑞1
𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 ∂𝜃𝜃⁄ < 0 < ∂𝑞𝑞0𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 ∂𝜃𝜃⁄ , ∂(𝑞𝑞0𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 + 𝑞𝑞1𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓) ∂𝜃𝜃⁄ > 0. An increase in the environmental tax rate leads to 
output reduction in both firms. However, when the concern for consumer surplus is relatively low 
the reduction is more significant in the FP firm; otherwise, the CF firm’ reduction is larger. On the 
other hand, an increase in the output subsidy leads to output expansion in both firms. When the 
concern for consumer surplus is relatively low the expansion is larger in the FP firm; otherwise, the 
CF firm’ expansion is larger. Finally, if the concern on consumer surplus rises, its direct effect is 
predictably positive on the CF firm’s output, negative on firm 1’s output, but positive on the 
aggregate output. 
The equilibrium payoffs and social welfare are, respectively: 
 
 𝑉𝑉0
𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 = 𝑡𝑡2�172−59𝜃𝜃−5𝜃𝜃2+2𝜃𝜃3�+�25+32𝜃𝜃−22𝜃𝜃2+3𝜃𝜃3�(1+𝑠𝑠)(1+𝑠𝑠−2𝑡𝑡)
2(7−𝜃𝜃)2(3−𝜃𝜃) , 
 𝜋𝜋1
𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 = 𝑡𝑡2�25−14𝜃𝜃+2𝜃𝜃2�+(2−𝜃𝜃)2(1+𝑠𝑠)(1+𝑠𝑠−2𝑡𝑡)
2(7−𝜃𝜃)(3−𝜃𝜃) , 
 𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 = � −16�1+𝑠𝑠
2+2𝑠𝑠(1−𝑡𝑡)−2𝑡𝑡+4𝑡𝑡2�(3−𝜃𝜃)2(7−𝜃𝜃)2
+4(183+139𝑠𝑠−51𝑡𝑡−64𝜃𝜃−52𝑠𝑠𝜃𝜃+28𝑡𝑡𝜃𝜃)(1+𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡)(7−𝜃𝜃)(3−𝜃𝜃)
−12�587−382𝜃𝜃+63𝜃𝜃2�(1+𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡)2 �
16(7−𝜃𝜃)2(3−𝜃𝜃)2  (9) 
 
IV.  Endogenous timing game 
We now discuss the equilibrium choice in an endogenous timing game. Each firm 𝑖𝑖 (𝑖𝑖 = 0,1) 
simultaneously chooses whether to move early (𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 1) or late (𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = 2). If both firms choose the same 
period, the equilibrium is a simultaneous-move game. Otherwise, the equilibrium is a sequential 
move game. Table I provides the payoff matrix of the observable delay game. 
   
Table  I: Payoff Matrix of the Observable Delay Game 
Firm 0/1    1=1t    2=1t  
 1=0t    ),( 10
ccV π    ),( 10
cfcfV π  
2=0t    ),( 10
fpfpV π    ),( 10
ccV π  
  
Using the revealed fact that the payoff of a firm when it is the leader is never smaller than its 
payoff in the simultaneous-move game, 𝑉𝑉0
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ≥ 𝑉𝑉0
𝑐𝑐  and 𝜋𝜋1
𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 ≥ 𝜋𝜋1
𝑐𝑐 , we have that (𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡1) = (2,2) 
never constitutes an equilibrium unless 𝑉𝑉0
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝑉𝑉0𝑐𝑐  and 𝜋𝜋1𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 = 𝜋𝜋1𝑐𝑐 . We can show that 𝑉𝑉0𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝑉𝑉0𝑐𝑐 
and 𝜋𝜋1
𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 = 𝜋𝜋1𝑐𝑐  never hold simultaneously. 
Comparing 𝑉𝑉0𝑐𝑐 and 𝑉𝑉0
𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓, we obtain the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1  𝑉𝑉0𝑐𝑐 ≥ 𝑉𝑉0
𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 if 0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 𝜃𝜃1 ≈ 0.658 or 𝜃𝜃 = 1. Otherwise, 𝑉𝑉0𝑐𝑐 < 𝑉𝑉0𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓.  
Proof. 𝑉𝑉0𝑐𝑐 − 𝑉𝑉0
𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 = (1+𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡)2(2−𝜃𝜃)(1−𝜃𝜃)�82−165𝜃𝜃+66𝜃𝜃2−7𝜃𝜃3�
8(7−𝜃𝜃)2(4−𝜃𝜃)2(3−𝜃𝜃) .  If 0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 < 1  and 0 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 < 1 + 𝑠𝑠 , the 
sign of 𝑉𝑉0𝑐𝑐 − 𝑉𝑉0
𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 depends on the sign of 82 − 165𝜃𝜃 + 66𝜃𝜃2 − 7𝜃𝜃3. Then, if 0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 𝜃𝜃1 ≈ 0.658, 
we have non-negative sign of this equation. If 𝜃𝜃 = 1, then 𝑉𝑉0𝑐𝑐 = 𝑉𝑉0𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓.  
 
Comparing 𝜋𝜋1𝑐𝑐  and 𝜋𝜋1
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, we obtain the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 2  𝜋𝜋1𝑐𝑐 ≥ 𝜋𝜋1
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  if 0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 2
3
. Otherwise, 𝜋𝜋1𝑐𝑐 < 𝜋𝜋1𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐.  
Proof. 𝜋𝜋1𝑐𝑐 − 𝜋𝜋1
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 3(1+𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡)2(2−3𝜃𝜃)�27+55(1−𝜃𝜃)+8𝜃𝜃2�
8(4−𝜃𝜃)2(21−4𝜃𝜃)2   If 0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 < 1 + 𝑠𝑠 , the sign of 
𝜋𝜋1
𝑐𝑐 − 𝜋𝜋1
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 depends on the sign of 2 − 3𝜃𝜃.  
 
From Lemmas 1-2, we obtain the following main result. 
 
Proposition 1  In a mixed duopoly with a consumer-friendly firm, the equilibrium of endogenous 
timing game is as follows:  
(a)  If 0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃1, the only equilibrium of the game is the simultaneous movement, that is, (𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡1) = (1,1);  
(b)  If 𝜃𝜃 = 𝜃𝜃1, either the simultaneous movement, (𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡1) = (1,1) or the sequential-move 
outcome in which the FP firm is the leader, (𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡1) = (2,1), are equilibrium outcomes;  
(c)  If 𝜃𝜃1 < 𝜃𝜃 < 23, the sequential-move outcome in which the FP firm is the leader, (𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡1) =(2,1), is the unique equilibrium outcome; 
(d)  If 2
3
≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1, either the CF firm or the FP firm could be the Stackelberg leader of the game, 
that is, (𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡1) = (1,2) and (𝑡𝑡0, 𝑡𝑡1) = (2,1), are the equilibrium outcomes.  
 
This proposition implies that regardless of the policy mix of emission tax and output subsidy, the 
equilibrium of endogenous market structure is determined solely by the consumer-friendly firm’s 
concern on consumer surplus. It is a surprising result that the equilibrium mode of competition 
remains unaffected by government tax/subsidy policy. Thus, it provides a new irrelevance result 
regarding the choice of government policy.8 
 
V.  Optimal policy mix 
 
The government will maximize the welfare function corresponding to the market structure, which 
is determined exclusively by 𝜃𝜃 accordingly to proposition 1 as follows:9 
 
                                                     
8 Since White (1996) and Pal and White (1998), the literature of mixed market where a public firm coexists with private 
ones have established a series of so-called “irrelevance results,” which states that privatization does not alter welfare 
regardless of time structure. 
9 In the cases where there are multiple equilibria (𝜃𝜃 = 𝜃𝜃1 or 23 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1), we assume that the government will set the 
subsidy and tax rates such as (𝑠𝑠∗, 𝑡𝑡∗) = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡;𝜃𝜃) = {(𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡)|𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡; 𝜃𝜃) = max{𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓,𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗}, 𝑠𝑠 ≥ 0,0 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 < 1 +
𝑠𝑠, 0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1}, where 𝑗𝑗 = 𝑐𝑐 or 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, accordingly. 
 𝑊𝑊(𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡;𝜃𝜃) =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐    0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃1
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥{𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐,𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓} 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐    𝜃𝜃 = 𝜃𝜃1
𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐    𝜃𝜃1 < 𝜃𝜃 < 23
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥{𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓,𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐} 𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐    2
3
≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1  (10) 
 
The corresponding value of 𝑠𝑠∗ and 𝑡𝑡∗:  
 𝑠𝑠∗(𝜃𝜃) =
⎩
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎧
3�4−4𝜃𝜃−𝜃𝜃2�
44+3𝜃𝜃2
𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐    0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃1
3�49−67𝜃𝜃+𝜃𝜃2+11𝜃𝜃3−2𝜃𝜃4�
667−384𝜃𝜃+129𝜃𝜃2−42𝜃𝜃3+6𝜃𝜃4
𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐    𝜃𝜃1 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 15 �9 − √26�
3�49−48𝜃𝜃−8𝜃𝜃2�
667+12𝜃𝜃+24𝜃𝜃2
𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐    1
5
�9 − √26� < 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1
4
�−12 + 11√2�0, 1
4
�−12 + 11√2�𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1
 (11) 
 
 𝑡𝑡∗(𝜃𝜃) =
⎩
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎧
8
44+3𝜃𝜃2
𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐    0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃1(11−3𝜃𝜃)2
667−384𝜃𝜃+129𝜃𝜃2−42𝜃𝜃3+6𝜃𝜃4
𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐    𝜃𝜃1 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 15 �9 − √26�
121
667+12𝜃𝜃+24𝜃𝜃2
𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐    1
5
�9 − √26� < 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1
4
�−12 + 11√2�
534−40𝜃𝜃+8𝜃𝜃2
3873−1180𝜃𝜃+104𝜃𝜃2
, 1
4
�−12 + 11√2�𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1
 (12) 
 
The CF firm produces more aggressively when the concern on consumer surplus 𝜃𝜃, is sufficiently 
large, resulting in a reduction in the production of the 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  firm. However the aggregate output 
increases. Thus, with a sufficiently large 𝜃𝜃 , the government has no incentive to stimulate the 
production of all firms, i.e., the optimal subsidy rate 𝑠𝑠 becomes zero. Also, this expansion on the 
aggregate output implies larger pollution emissions, which makes the government raise the emission 
tax in order to mitigate the welfare loss due to environmental damage through the abatement efforts 
of the firms. 
The resulting welfare after some simplifications: 
 
 𝑊𝑊∗(𝜃𝜃) =
⎩
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎧
12
44+3𝜃𝜃2
, 0 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 < 𝜃𝜃1
3(11−3𝜃𝜃)2
2(667−384𝜃𝜃+129𝜃𝜃2−42𝜃𝜃3+6𝜃𝜃4) , 𝜃𝜃1 ≤ 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 15 �9 − √26�
363
2(667+12𝜃𝜃+24𝜃𝜃2) , 15 �9 − √26� < 𝜃𝜃 ≤ 14 �−12 + 11√2�
3�681−184𝜃𝜃−16𝜃𝜃2�
2(3873−1180𝜃𝜃+104𝜃𝜃2) , 14 �−12 + 11√2�𝜃𝜃 ≤ 1
 (13) 
 
Figure 1c shows that the corresponding welfare level is decreasing as 𝜃𝜃  increases. It is 
noteworthy that the first-best allocation can be achieved by the optimal policy mix with (11) and (12) 
only when the degree of concern on consumer surplus is zero and thus both firms have symmetric 
payoffs, which results in a simultaneous-move outcome.10 
    
  
(a) Optimal subsidy (b) Optimal tax 
 
(c) Maximum welfare 
 
Figure 1: Optimal subsidy, tax and social welfare 
                                                     
10 The first-best allocations (denoted by ’B’) where the output and abatement levels of the firms maximize the social 
welfare in (3) are as follows: 𝑞𝑞0𝐵𝐵 = 𝑞𝑞1𝐵𝐵 = 311, 𝑎𝑎0𝐵𝐵 = 𝑎𝑎1𝐵𝐵 = 211 and 𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵 = 311 
 Proposition 2 The first-best allocation can be attained by the optimal policy mix only when the 
concern on consumer surplus is abandoned, which results in a simultaneous-move outcome.  
 
This proposition implies that the emergence of a consumer-friendly public firm might not be 
socially beneficial even though the government uses an appropriate policy mix of emission tax and 
output subsidy before firms decide their roles in the endogenous timing game. Also, the sequential-
move outcomes appear as equilibrium results when the concern on consumer surplus is not negligible, 
which causes welfare loss even under the optimal policy mix. These findings are consistent with the 
previous results in private and mixed duopolies. Under quantity setting game without government 
policy, firms decide simultaneously in a private duopoly with symmetric payoffs while firms decide 
sequentially in a mixed duopoly with asymmetric payoffs. (See Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Pal (1998) 
and Tomaru and Kiyono (2010).) Further, under output subsidization Tomaru and Saito (2010) 
showed that only Cournot competition is an equilibrium outcome in a mixed duopoly with a higher 
subsidy rate.11 Thus, we extend their analysis into the case with externality and show that the 
equilibrium does hold under the optimal emission tax. 
 
VI.  Concluding remarks 
 This paper aimed to provide a new irrelevance result. We considered a consumer-friendly public 
firm and analyzed an endogenous timing game when the government uses emission tax and output 
subsidy. We showed that regardless of the policy mix, the equilibrium of endogenous market 
structure is determined by the consumer-friendly public firm’s concern on consumer surplus. Thus, 
the equilibrium mode of competition remains unaffected by government tax/subsidy policy. Finally, 
we showed that the first-best allocation for social welfare could be attained only when the concern 
on consumer surplus is abandoned, which results in a simultaneous-move outcome. Our results may 
have an important implication for economic models in mixed market settings. However, these 
                                                     
11 Zikos (2007) examined an R&D subsidy while Lee and Xu (2017) considered an emission tax. Also, Lee and Tomaru 
(2017) analyzed the policy mix of output and R&D subsidies and showed that the first-best allocation could be attained 
irrespective of the asymmetric payoffs between the firms. 
findings should further be treated in the context of differentiated products and different costs.  
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Appendix I. The case where CF firm concerns about welfare 
 
Consider the case where the payoff of the consumer friendly public firm is as follows: 
 𝑉𝑉0 = 𝜋𝜋0 + 𝜃𝜃𝑊𝑊 (I.1) 
a. Fixed Timing Game 
 
Simultaneous move game outputs and abatements: 
 𝑞𝑞0𝑐𝑐 = 𝑠𝑠(2+2𝜃𝜃−3𝜃𝜃2)+(1+𝜃𝜃)(2+3𝜃𝜃−2𝑡𝑡(1−3𝜃𝜃))8+23𝜃𝜃+12𝜃𝜃2   
 𝑞𝑞1𝑐𝑐 = 2+6𝜃𝜃+3𝜃𝜃2+𝑠𝑠(2+7𝜃𝜃+5𝜃𝜃2)−𝑡𝑡(2+9𝜃𝜃+6𝜃𝜃2)8+23𝜃𝜃+12𝜃𝜃2   
 𝑎𝑎0𝑐𝑐 = 𝑡𝑡(8−5𝜃𝜃−6𝜃𝜃2)+𝜃𝜃(4+3𝜃𝜃+𝑠𝑠(4+𝜃𝜃))8+23𝜃𝜃+12𝜃𝜃2   
 𝑎𝑎1𝑐𝑐 = 𝑡𝑡 (I.2) 
CF firm as a Stackelberg leader outputs and abatements: 
 𝑞𝑞0
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 6+15𝜃𝜃+8𝜃𝜃2+𝑠𝑠(6+9𝜃𝜃−4𝜃𝜃2)−𝑡𝑡(6−3𝜃𝜃−10𝜃𝜃2)
21+60𝜃𝜃+32𝜃𝜃2
  
 𝑞𝑞1
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 5+𝜃𝜃(15+8𝜃𝜃)+𝑠𝑠(1+𝜃𝜃)(5+12𝜃𝜃)−𝑡𝑡(5+21𝜃𝜃+14𝜃𝜃2)
21+4𝜃𝜃(15+8𝜃𝜃)   
 𝑎𝑎0
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝑡𝑡(21−14𝜃𝜃−18𝜃𝜃2)+𝜃𝜃(11+8𝜃𝜃+𝑠𝑠(11+4𝜃𝜃))
21+60𝜃𝜃+32𝜃𝜃2
  
 𝑎𝑎1
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝑡𝑡 (I.3) 
FP firm as a Stackelberg leader outputs and abatements: 
 𝑞𝑞0
𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 = (1+𝜃𝜃)�5+21𝜃𝜃+25𝜃𝜃2+8𝜃𝜃3−𝑡𝑡�5−3𝜃𝜃−44𝜃𝜃2−28𝜃𝜃3��+𝑠𝑠(5+18𝜃𝜃+7𝜃𝜃2−25𝜃𝜃3−16𝜃𝜃4)(1+2𝜃𝜃)(21+78𝜃𝜃+76𝜃𝜃2+22𝜃𝜃3)   
 𝑞𝑞1
𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 = (3+9𝜃𝜃+5𝜃𝜃2)(2+6𝜃𝜃+3𝜃𝜃2+𝑠𝑠(2+7𝜃𝜃+5𝜃𝜃2)−𝑡𝑡(2+9𝜃𝜃+6𝜃𝜃2))
21+120𝜃𝜃+232𝜃𝜃2+174𝜃𝜃3+44𝜃𝜃4
  
 𝑎𝑎0
𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 = �11(1+𝑠𝑠)𝜃𝜃+𝜃𝜃2�42+37𝑠𝑠+43𝜃𝜃+30𝑠𝑠𝜃𝜃+13𝜃𝜃2+7𝑠𝑠𝜃𝜃2�+𝑡𝑡(21+46𝜃𝜃−29𝜃𝜃2−73𝜃𝜃3−26𝜃𝜃4) �(1+2𝜃𝜃)(21+78𝜃𝜃+76𝜃𝜃2+22𝜃𝜃3)   
 𝑎𝑎1
𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 = 𝑡𝑡(21+122𝜃𝜃+243𝜃𝜃2+189𝜃𝜃3+50𝜃𝜃4)−𝜃𝜃(1+𝜃𝜃)(2+6𝜃𝜃+3𝜃𝜃2+𝑠𝑠(2+7𝜃𝜃+5𝜃𝜃2))
21+120𝜃𝜃+232𝜃𝜃2+174𝜃𝜃3+44𝜃𝜃4
 (I.4) 
 
b. Endogenous timing game 
 
Consider the payoff matrix in Table 1 to obtain the endogenous timing equilibrium. Note that the 
payoff of the firms when it is the leader is never smaller than its payoff in the simultaneous-move 
game: 𝑉𝑉0𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑉𝑉0
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 and 𝜋𝜋1𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝜋𝜋1
𝑐𝑐.  
 
Comparing 𝑉𝑉0𝑐𝑐 and 𝑉𝑉0
𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓, we obtain the following difference: 
 𝑉𝑉0𝑐𝑐 − 𝑉𝑉0
𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 = � (1+𝜃𝜃)(2(1+𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡)+(6+7𝑠𝑠−9𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃+(3+5𝑠𝑠−6𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃2)
2(1+2𝜃𝜃)2(8+23𝜃𝜃+12𝜃𝜃2)2(21+78𝜃𝜃+76𝜃𝜃2+22𝜃𝜃3)2� Γ0𝑉𝑉 (I.5) 
where Γ0𝑉𝑉 = 246(1 + 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑡𝑡) + 3(1258 + 1467𝑠𝑠 − 1885𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃 + (26339 + 35456𝑠𝑠 − 59873𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃2 + (107649 +164146𝑠𝑠 − 337935𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃3 + (279733 + 475485𝑠𝑠 − 1113250𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃4 + 4(119095 + 223514𝑠𝑠 − 565567𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃5 +2(267467 + 552012𝑠𝑠 − 1455752𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃6 + (391108 + 886777𝑠𝑠 − 2374489𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃7 + (178871 + 445665𝑠𝑠 −1188518𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃8 + 8(5807 + 15907𝑠𝑠 − 41636𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃9 + 16(327 + 985𝑠𝑠 − 2502𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃10. 
 
Comparing 𝜋𝜋1𝑐𝑐  and  𝜋𝜋1
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐, we obtain the following difference: 
 𝜋𝜋1𝑐𝑐 − 𝜋𝜋1
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = �3(1+2𝜃𝜃)(2(1+𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡)+(7+12𝑠𝑠−22𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃+(4+18𝑠𝑠−31𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃2+4(2𝑠𝑠−3𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃3)
2(8+23𝜃𝜃+12𝜃𝜃2)2(21+60𝜃𝜃+32𝜃𝜃2)2 � 𝛤𝛤1𝜋𝜋 (I.6) 
where Γ1𝜋𝜋 = 82(1 + 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑡𝑡) + 37(13 + 14𝑠𝑠 − 16𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃 + (956 + 1136𝑠𝑠 − 1385𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃2 + 2(368 + 502𝑠𝑠 − 611𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃3 +8(24 + 38𝑠𝑠 − 45𝑡𝑡)𝜃𝜃4 
 
The sign of both differences depends on 𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡 and 𝜃𝜃, therefore the endogenous timing equilibrium 
also depends on 𝑠𝑠, 𝑡𝑡 and 𝜃𝜃. 
